Pension reform, growth, and the labor market in Ukraine by Riboud, Michelle & Hoaquan Chu
\/PS  173\
POLICY  RESEARCH  WORKING  PAPER  1 7c;  i
Pension Reform,  Growth,  requ  .is-,
1  T  u  ar  1  r~~~~~~~~~~~estc  {C.  to........  >'.'!e  t  ' and the Labor Market  ys!e,.--
in Ukraine
Michelle Riboud  t  . -:
Hoaquan  Chu
The World Bank
Europe and Central Asia
Country Department  IV

















































































































dPOLICY  RESEARCH  WORKING  PAPER  1731
Summary findings
In recent  years  - as a result  of economic  contraction,  Reform  is essential.  Restoring  the former  system
declining  employment  and real  wages,  and  changes  in the  would  be too  costly,  and  maintaining  the status  quo
behavior  of  the labor  market  - Ukraine's  tax base of the  would  make  the  system unsustainable.
social  security  system has declined,  threatening  its  *  Reforms  which  focus  on short-term  budgetary
sustainability.  About  40 percent  of the  labor  force  works  effects  and neglect  the  interactions  between  the social
in the informal  sector,  paying  no taxes,  and  many  security  system and  the labor  market  are  likely to fail.
members  of the  formal  workforce  underpay  taxes  a  Raising  the  retirement  age to 65 would  have  a
because  they  also do  informal  work.  significant  financial  impact  but would  need  to be
Using a model  that  links  the social  security  system,  the  accompanied  by deeper  structural  reforms.  Raising  the
labor  market,  and the macroeconomy,  Riboud  and Chu  retirement  age quickly  may  entail  the least  political  cost,
ran  simulations  to  assess the  sustainability  of the  current  as many  old  people  are currently  working.
pension  system  and the  relevance  and  viability  of possible  *  For  the deeper  structural  reforms  needed,
reforms.  All simulations  assume  economic  reform  and  introducing  a funded-tier  should  be considered.  It would
the resumption  of growth.  They  conclude:  be an  effective  way to correct  distortions  and  restore
*  Economic  contraction  is not  the  only cause  of  credibility.
problems  with the  pension  system.  To  reverse  current  - Introducing  such  reforms  will be costly  and affect
trends,  most  of the  labor  force  would  need  to be working  several  generations  of workers  and  pensioners  in
in the formal  sector  - an unlikely  event,  given  current  different  ways.  Tradeoffs  must  be carefully  evaluated.
incentives.
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Country Department IV
Europe and Central AsiaI. Introduction
The social security system in Ukraine has many components that are carried over from
the Soviet era.  The benefits provided by the system include pensions;  maternity, sickness, and
other employee benefits; unemployment insurance benefits and job search assistance for
unemployed workers; and allowances for the elderly and families with children.  In addition, a
special fund has been set up to assist the victims of the Chemobyl accident.  About 80 percent of
benefits are financed through payroll taxes amounting to 52 percent, while the remaining is
financed out of general revenues of the state or from local government budgets. Overall, about 15
percent of GDP is spent on the various programs in 1996 (see Table 1). By far the most
important program is the pension system which represents about 8 percent of GDP and provides
benefits to more than a quarter of the population (over 14 million Ukrainians in 1996).
Over recent years, in Ukraine as in many other FSU countries,  economic and political
developments - in particular the sharp economic contraction experienced since 1990 -have put
under strain the social protection system.  Resources shrank sharply at a time when the claim for
these resources increased,  raising issues of coverage, benefit adequacy and sustainability. The
major concerns have been on the one hand, the contribution of the social security system to
massive budget deficits, and on the other hand, the failure to provide an adequate safety net.
These issues have been at the center of all discussions regarding stabilization and
structural reforms and the proposed solutions have mostly consisted of expenditure cuts
accompanied by improved targeting of limited resources toward a smaller group of beneficiaries.
While defining these recommendations, the analysis has focused on the immediate trade-offs
between the fiscal adjustment and the establishment of a comprehensive social safety net.  Little
attention has been paid to the possible impact of the proposed changes on the rest of the economy
- in particular on the labor market, savings and investment, and the growth path of the economy.
Now that Ukraine seems more firmly engaged into a reform process and that economic
prospects are improving, increasing attention needs to be paid to the issue of long-term
sustainability and adequacy of system design. In this context  taking into account the interactions
between the social security system and other key economic variables becomes increasingly
important.
The objective of this paper is to examine the viability of the current pension system and
the relevance of possible pension system reforms by integrating the social security system within
a macroeconomic framework which reflects the specific features of the Ukrainian economy.  The
analysis focuses on the main component of the social security system, the pension system, and
explicitly takes into account the links that exist between the various parameters which determine
in the short and medium term the balance of the pension fund and other key economic and
demographic variables which affect the growth path of the economy, notably labor force
participation behavior, unemployment, the size of the informal sector and the path of real wage
growth.  This approach allows for taking into account incentive effects and  measuring trade-offs
between  various goals.2
TabIle1
Social  Protection  Expenditures  as  % of GDP
1992  1993  1994  1995  1996
(est
Total  16.2  13.1  13.7  13.6  14.5
Financed  out  of payroll  taxes  13.2  10.6  11.4  11.1  11.4
Pension  Fund  8.8  8.3  8.0  7.9  8.1
Social  Insurance  Fund  1.2  0.8  1.1  1.0  1.0
Employment  Fund  0.2  0.2  0.3  0.3  0.3
Chernobyl  Fund  3.0  1.3  2.0  1.9  2.0
Financed  out  of general  budget  revenues
Allowance  for  elderly  &  children  3.0  2.5  2.3  2.5  3.1
Other  social  spending
Health,  Education,  &  Culture  11.2  9.6  11.3  11.7  10.5
Consumer  subsidies  5.6  10.3  6.7  3.2  2.5
Memo:  GDP  (trillions  of Kbv)  5.033  148.3  1138  5293  8686
Source: Data Provided by the Ukrainian authorities and World Bank estimates.
The following section provides a brief description of the structure and features of the
pension system in Ukraine.  Section 3 analyzes the impact of recent macroeconomic trends and
transformation of the labor market on the balance of the pension fund.  It also documents the
changes introduced in the system since the country's independence.  Section 4 describes the
model and contains an analysis of the medium-term sustainability prospects.  The analysis is
made assuming that Ukraine will pursue its reform efforts and recover a growth path.  The first
question examined in the paper is whether sustained growth and macroeconomic stability over a
period of  about 30 years would make possible the restoration of benefit levels and features
prevailing in the past.  It will be shown that this option needs to be ruled out even in the context
of a fairly optimistic growth scenario. Section 4 then turns to a second question: whether it would
be viable to maintain the system "as it is" currently, that is, with the less generous features
introduced recently. The answer will be again negative based on expected behavioral changes.
As reforms appear unavoidable, Section 5 analyzes several alternatives.  The first part of
the section deals with reforms of limited scope which focus on reducing coverage and
expenditures without changing the nature of the system. Particular attention is paid to a possible
increase in the retirement age. An attempt is made to assess whether these reforms would be3
effective and sufficient to ensure the sustainability of the pension system.  The second part of
Section 5 examines more radical reforms consisting of shifting from the current PAYG to a fully-
funded system.  Several transition paths and their associated costs are analyzed taking into
account the specificity of local conditions.  Section  6 provides detailed conclusions.
II.  Description of the Pension System.
2.1.  Types of  Pensions.
The Ukraine Pension system is similar to public pension schemes in many industrialized
countries (World Bank, 1993). It is based on the pay-as-you-go (PAYG) principle. Workers and
their employers make contributions to the program over their active careers. These contributions
finance benefits to current pensioners.  The present employer contribution rate is 32.56 percent of
workers' salaries; employees contribute 1 percent of their wages. The pension system currently
offers five types of pensions to more than 14 million beneficiaries (Kane 1996):
Old age pension.  Men over the age of 60 and women over 55 are eligible to receive an
old age pension.  For the full standard pension, men must have worked for 25 years, and women
20 years, in covered employment.  The level of a standard old age pension equals 55 percent of
reference earnings (an index of 5 peak years of earnings), plus 1 percent for each year over the
minimum standard pension employment years.  The normal ceiling of a standard pension is 3
times the minimum pension.  People who have not worked long enough to earn a standard
pension but have reached the retirement age are eligible for a partial pension.  The level of a
partial pension depends on the number of employment years but is no less than 50 percent of
minimum old age pension.  The old age pension program is by far the most important since it
benefits about 80 percent of all pensioners (about 11 million individuals).
Invalidity pension.  This type of pension is available for those who are injured or too
sick to work (that is, about 10 percent of all pensioners, or about 1.4 million individuals).
Depending on the invalidity category and the number of years of covered employment, the
pension level can vary from half the minimum wage to 3 times the minimum wage.
Survivor's pension.  This pension is available for the spouse or minor children of
deceased workers (currently about 800 thousand beneficiaries).  Survivor's pensions are in
general lower than old-age or invalidity pensions.  The average survivor's pension is only about
two-thirds of the average old-age pension.  For minor children the maximum eligible age of
receiving the survivor's pension is 18.
Social pension.  This pension is for those who have not worked in covered employment
but who meet certain conditions, such as being over the normal retirement age or disabled from
birth.  As social pensions are made available to those who are not contributing to the fund  they4
are a form of social assistance payments which has a wide coverage.  The level of a social
pension is equal to 50 percent of the minimum old age pension, and can be between 30 and 200
percent of the minimum old age pension for invalids and disabled.  About half a million persons
receive social pensions.
Service pension.  This program is the smallest (only about 40 thousand. beneficiaries).
These pensions are a particular type of old-age pensions for workers in special occupations (such
as aviators, truck drivers, lumbermen etc..). These workers can retire at a younger age or with
shorter duration of employment.
In addition, the pension fund is made responsible for paying certain child allowances
(IMF, 1996).  However, these allowances represent a relatively small amount (about 3 percent of
total Fund outlays).
2.2.  Main Features of the Pension System.
Compared with many equivalent systems in OECD countries, Ukraine's pension system is
generous in several aspects:
Low retirement age.  The normal retirement age is 60 for men and 55 for women. In
many OECD countries such as Germany, Italy, and Japan, the normal retirement age is 65 for
both men and women. As noted below, the actual age at which people can start collecting a
pension can be even younger.
Generous eligibility conditions. The generosity of the system is also reflected in several
additional characteristics. First, people can start collecting a pension before the retirement age if
they have accumulated enough years of covered employment.  Second, people in certain
occupations and industries are permitted to retire before the regular retirement age.  These
workers  may receive privileged pensions that are higher than the maximum standard old age
pension. Third, people can continue to work even after they have started collecting old age
pensions. If they work in a covered sector the post-retirement working years still count in the
pension level calculation. Fourth, covered employment includes non-contributing activities, such
as higher education, armed services, and caring for disabled person or a child under the age of 3.
High replacement ratio. The level of pension compared with the wage level is
relatively high' in Ukraine. After working for 25 years, a male worker is eligible to receive
an old-age  pension  that is 55 percent of his reference  earnings. Women receive  the same
percentage  after working for 20 years. For each additional  year worked, the replacement  rate
increases  by 1 percentage  point. Thus, for a typical  full career worker who has worked for 40
As will be explained below, this feature has been modified since 1993.5
years, a full pension replaces about 70-75 percent of previous earnings. In advanced
industrialized countries, a public retirement pension replaces only about 40-70 percent of their
average wages while at work.
All these factors have contributed to a high level of spending for pensions and to a
situation whereby pensioners have come to represent over a quarter of the population. Pension
expenditures in Ukraine - as in many other transitional economies (Fox, 1994) - represent a
higher proportion of GDP (about 8 percent) than the average observed in countries with
comparable income per capita (2.9 percent in lower-middle income countries, 6.9 percent in
upper-middle income countries).
III.  Recent Macroeconomic and Labor Market Trends and their Impact on the Pension
System.
3.1.  Macroeconomic Trends
Since its independence,  Ukraine like other FSU countries experienced a sharp economic
contraction and substantial macroimbalances (Table 2).  Between 1991 and 1994, the
macroeconomic environment deteriorated continuously.  The monthly inflation rate reached an
average of 47 percent in 1993 and the decline in GDP accelerated to 24 percent in 1994 leading
to an accumulated 45 percent decline since 1991. It was only in October  1994 that the
Government initiated serious reform efforts -including a reduction in the budget deficit to 5
percent of GDP in 1995, price and trade liberalization, and the start of mass and small-scale
privatization. These efforts have resulted in a sharp reduction in monthly rates of inflation (to
about 1 percent in  mid-1996) and  a slowdown of the decline in real GDP.  However, the
resumption of growth is not expected before 1997.
The sharp economic contraction has put great strains on the social protection system - and
in particular on the pension system.  While the number of beneficiaries has continued to grow
(although slowly), the revenues of the fund declined sharply as a result of significant changes in
the labor market.
First of all, real wages fell sharply leading to the decline of the wage bill, tax base of the
pension system.  The sharpest decline occurred between 1990 and 1993 with real wages falling to
about 37 percent of their 1990 level. During the same period GDP fell in a lesser proportion, only
to 68 percent of its previous level.  Further wage decline in 1994 was compensated by an
increase in 1995 leaving real wages currently at their 1993 level.6
Table  2
Macroeconomic  Indicators
1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996
(est.)
Real GDP growth rate  -3.896  -8.4%  -9.7%  -14.2%  -23.5*  -11.8%  -7.9%
GNP  per capita (US$)(Atlas)  ..  2636  2753  2439  1913  1650  1514
As e  of GDP
Current account deficit  -6.1  -4.2  -2.2
Fiscal Deficit  -14  -29  -12  -8.2  -4.7  -2.8
External  Debt  ..  ..  ..  ..  23.8  23.0  21.4
Real  exchange  rate  index  (1/1993=100)  ..  ..  125  108  54  47  39
Nominal exchange rate  (1000  LC/$)  0.0006  0.0022  0.0336  1.288  49.86  147.0  200.0
Inflation  rate  (year  average)  ..  ..  1210  4735  891  376  75
Data  Source:  World  Bank
Second, while total employment only fell by 10 percent between 1992 and 1995 and
open unemployment remains low (2.4 percent in 1995)  , significant changes have occurred in
terms of labor force participation, occupational choice and allocation of time between various
occupations. As explained below, these changes have induced a decline in the number of
contributors to the social security system.
3.2.  Changes in Labor Force Participation and Occupational Choice
Labor force participation rates observed in the FSU were high, mostly due to the fact that
women had reached in the early 80s the highest labor force participation  rates in the world 3(see
Mincer, 1985). As in other industrialized countries, women had been drawn into the labor force
through the migrations from rural toward urban areas, substituting work outside the household
for family agricultural work.  The process had been accompanied by a marked rise in the level of
women's education and a similarly sharp decline in fertility.  The soviet socialist economic
system, ideology and growth strategy had played an additional key role in hastening the
incorporation of women in the labor force (see Ofer & Vinokur 1985).
Although labor force participation rates were high over most of the life-cycle, rates were
extremely low before the age of 20 and  were falling sharply after the age of 55 for women and
2Estimate based on World Bank Household Survey (1995) - other estimates (See Rapawy 1996, WB Poverty
Assessment  1996)  are of the same  order of magnitude. Inspite  of low open  unemployment,  there is evidence  of
hidden  unemployment.  It is estimated  that in 1995,  approximately  2 million  employees  of state-owned  enterprises
stay  on the payroll  although  working  for shorter  hours or on leave  without  pay.
3 except  among  the Moslem  population  who had quite different  demographic  and labor  force  behavior  (higher
fertility  and lower  labor  force  participation)  than the rest of the population.7
60 for men.  This could be explained by the development of, and easy access to the education
sector and the low retirement age. At young ages, the labor force behavior observed in the FSU
was close to the one observed in European countries in which large public investments in
education took place and labor force participation rates were significantly below those observed
in Anglo-Saxon countries (OECD, 1994).
The transition brought about several changes. As a response to the sharp income decline
and cuts in public spending, labor force participation rates increased sharply for both men and
women in the 15-19 age group and at old ages (see Chart 1). For example, in the age group 60-
64, rates increased from 32 to 77 percent between 1989 and 1995 for men, and from 14 to 67
percent for women.
Chart  1. Ukraine  Labor  Force  Participation  Rates
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Source: World Bank household Survey (1995)
Another change has been the increased importance of informal activities.  One
important form of such activities in Ukraine consists of work on land plots, cattle/poultry
breeding etc.. which represent significant sources of additional income.  These activities are
performed either as a complement to employment in the formal economy or have become the
main occupation. In 1995, over 65 percent of men and women employed by a state or private
enterprise  report spending additional time working on land plots. And over half of those who do
not report being employed in the formal sector indicate that they work on land plots.  In other
words, in addition to a large proportion of those employed who allocate part of their time to
4  This  number  largely  exceeds  the number  of hidden  unemployed  estimated  to about 2 million  workers in 1995
(IMF 1996).8
secondary - informal - activities, a high proportion of the labor force has informal work activities
as main occupation (see Table 3 ).  Another important form of possible informal activities can
be self-employment. Although one could have expected to see self-employment develop rapidly
during the transition, available data indicate that self-employment remains very limited in
Ukraine.  About 5 percent of working men (and 3 percent for women) report self-employment as
their main occupation and a very small proportion of the labor force combine self-employment
with other types of occupation.
ZablQ  3
Labor  Force  Participation  Rates
Employment  Rates  in Formal  e  Informal  Sectors
- 1995  -
MEN  WOMEN
Labor force participation rate for population aged 15+  .79  .71
Total Employment rate (Population  aged 15+)  .76  .70
Employment rate in the formal sector  .51  .37
% of those working in the formal sector:
- also working on land plots  .66  .67
- also working as self-  employed  .05  .04
Note:
1. In the calculation of employment rates, unemployed are excluded.
2. People working exclusively on land plots or as self-employed are assumed to belong to
the informal sector.
Source: 1995 Household Survey
The fact that a significant proportion of the labor force allocates time - sometimes
exclusively - to occupations that can be qualified as informal and thus not subject to tax
enforcement leads to a significant reduction in the number of contributors to the public social
security system.  Chart 2  shows total male and female activity rates as well as rates calculated
on the basis of participation to formal employment5  . Employment rates in the formal economy
are found to be substantially lower than total employment rates for both men and women. The
discrepancy between these two rates is particularly strong  for women.  Overall, while 76 percent
of men and 70 percent of women aged 15+ report working activities, only 51 percent of men and
37 percent of  women are engaged in formal activities (though not exclusively).  Thus, one third
of men and approximately one half of women in the labor force are likely to avoid any form  of
taxation of their labor income. It is also worth noticing that most of the increased work activity
observed in recent years both at young and old ages is taking place in the informal sector (see
Chart 1).
Individuals working exclusively on land plots or as self-employed are considered as working in the infornal
economy.9
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Clearly, the economic transformation during the transition has led to significant changes
in occupational choice and allocation of time within the household.  The collapse of real wages
in the formal sector has induced workers to allocate part - or all - of their working time to
informal activities. Within households, the allocation of time is marked by a return toward a
more traditional division of labor between men and women with women devoting a much higher
proportion of their time to obtaining a secondary income, especially at young and old ages.10
An additional factor contributes to depress even further the tax base of the pension
system. There is increasing evidence that, even in the formal sector, a substantial amount of
underreporting of productive activities and sales takes place.  A March 1996 survey indicates that
39 percent of sales of all enterprises (48 percent for private enterprises) remain hidden in Ukraine
(see Kaufman, 1996). This phenomenon is neither new nor specific to Ukraine. Personal
informal incomes and outlays were extremely widespread in the FSU: 75 percent or more of
households derived over 5 percent of their income from informal sources and 40 percent derived
over one fourth in the late 1970s in Ukraine ( see Grossman, 1989). The phenomenon is also
observed in many transition economies (see for example, Arvay and Vertes 1995 for the case of
Hungary). Its relative importance however, may have increased over recent years.
Overall, the decline in real wages, the fall in formal employment and underreporting of
productive activities in the formal sector have contributed to a decline in the reported wage bill
and thus, to an erosion of the tax base for the social security system. By 1993, the share of wages
(net of taxes) in GDP had fallen to 23 percent, down from about 45 percent in 1991 (see Table 4)
As a result, while until 1993 payroll contributions were sufficient to cover the
expenditures of the Pension Fund, spending climbed much faster than contributions in 1993
leading to a transfer from the central budget equal to about 2.6 percent of GDP to cover the
deficit (see Table 5).
3.3  The Government's Response
Faced with resource limitations, the Government was unable to maintain a significant
budget transfer to the Fund after 1993. Thus it  opted for shrinking benefits while attempting to
preserve a minimum standard of living for low-income pensioners.  This was achieved by
narrowing the range of payments and reducing the overall benefit level.  As the majority of
pensions (standard old-age pensions) are subject to a cap, the Government controlled the level of
the maximum pension and let it drift relative to the average wage.  While in 1991 the maximum
pension was 7 percent above the average wage, it fell to less than half the average wage by 1993
and declined even further since then (see Table  4).  As a consequence, an increasing number of
pensioners received the maximum pension.  This also applied to new pensioners who reached
retirement with high wages (as a result of inflation and growing wage inequality).  In contrast, to
protect low-income pensioners the level of the minimum pension was increased relative to the
average wage thus leading to a sharp compression of pension levels.
As a result, the effective replacement rate fell to approximately 1/3 of the average wage
and on the expenditure side, the system moved closer to a social assistance program providing
benefits  loosely connected to the level of previous wages and years of contribution. On the
revenue side, the system maintained its social insurance feature by taxing -heavily -reported
wages of workers in the formal sector, that is, currently only about 60 percent of the labor force.11
Tabl-  A
Pension and Wage  Rates in  Ukraine
1991  1992  1993  1994  1995
Average pension/average wage  0.44  0.49  0.42  0.36  0.32
Maximum pension/average wage  1.07  0.69  0.45  0.42  0.31
Average pension/Average social pension  1.63  2.58  2.85  2.53  2.62
Average wage  (000  kbv/month)  6.37  155.1  1375.5  7347.91
Wage  bill  (as % of GDP)  |_  |  33%  23%  271;  33%
Real wage  (1990=100)  81.3  36.8  32.9  36.9
Source: Data provided by the Ukrainian authorities, Tacis, and World Bank estimates.
Pension Fund Balance as% of GDP
1992  1993  1994  1995  1996
_  _  _  _  _  _  ________  _______  (pro.)
Pension Fund balance  2.8  0.7  0.8  0.1  0.0
Revenue  11.6  9.0  8.8  8.0  8.1
Payroll Contributions  . 6.3  8.2  7.2  7.6
Budget  Transfers  ..  2.6  0.5  0.6  0.5
Other  . 0.1  0.1  0.2  0.0
Expenditure  8.8  8.3  8.0  7.9  8.1
Old-age  pensions  ..  6.4  5.2  4.2  4.6
Military  pensions  ..  0.2  0.3  0.4  0.4
Child  allowances  ..  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2
Other  pensions  ..  1.5  2.3  3.1  2.9
Memo:
Consolidated government budget balance  -17.8  -10.3  -8.2  -5.2  -3.4
Revenue  41.6  44.0  45.5  42.5  42.8
Expenditure  59.4  54.4  53.7  47.7  46.2
GDP  (trillions  of Kbv)  5.03  148.3  1138  5293  8686
Source: Data provided by the Ukrainian authorities and World Bank estimates.
IV.  Non-Reform Scenarios: Medium Term Sustainability Prospects
Before the sharp economic downturn, the accounts of the Ukraine Pension Fund were
balanced.  Indeed, between 1990 and 1992, the Fund was able to run  a small surplus and
pensioners enjoyed the relatively generous provisions outlined in Section II.  The current
cutbacks were forced by the stark economic reality and are viewed by many decision makers as
only temporary.  This explains why the most fundamental characteristics of the Soviet-era12
system, such as early retirement ages and wide coverage, have remained intact and why
discussions on possible reforms have remained limited. Thus the first basic question to examine
is whether this view is realistic and whether the country can restore the old pension benefit
schemes once the economy recovers? If not,  two questions arise: would the pension system be
sustainable if one were to keep its most recently introduced features or should one envisage
deeper structural reforms ?
4.1.  Methodology and Basic Assumptions
A.  The Model
To address these questions, a simulation model has been constructed. It integrates four
modules: pension fund, labor market, macroeconomic, and demographic modules (see Appendix
A for a detailed description of the model).  The model covers the period 1995-2030 and provides
a consistent framework for analyzing the balance of the Pension Fund under current provisions as
well as for assessing the impact of various policy reforms. It allows for taking into account the
interactions between the social security system and other key economic variables
The Pension Fund module calculates the Fund balance for each year based on expenditure
and contribution data provided by the other modules. The number of pensioners depends on
demographic factors and eligibility rules set by the pension system. The level of contributions to
the fund depends not only on the level of employment, wages and the social security tax but also
on the relative importance of the informal sector. It is assumed that workers in the informal
sector do not contribute to the pension fund although they may be future beneficiaries either
because they have accumulated rights in the past (prior to, or in the early stages of the transition)
or because they are eligible for social pensions under the present set of regulations. The Pension
Fund is linked to the consolidated government account.  So a large and persistent deficit can
undermine fiscal balance and threaten macroeconomic stability.
The labor market module defines trends in employment and real wages responding to the
evolution of macroeconomic conditions.  It calculates total labor income in the formal economy.
This in turn determines the revenues of the Pension fund for a given level of the social security
tax. The flow of workers exiting the labor force and eligible for retirement determines the stock
and age composition of pensioners.  The allocation of workers between the formal and informal
sectors responds to changes in relative wages (net of social security contributions) in these two
economic sectors.
The production sector is divided into two parts: formal and informal. It is assumed that
shifting production to the informal sector reduces overall economic efficiency. So the effect of
investment on growth declines as the size of the informal sector expands.  Lower efficiency in
the informal sector originates from greater uncertainty and ill-defined property rights which raise13
operating costs, hinder the exploitation of economies of scale and, more generally, increase
transaction costs (see Kaufmann & Kaliberta, 1996). Distortions in the labor market arising, in
particular, from the high rate of taxation on labor in the formal sector create incentives for a
reallocation of labor toward the informal sector. The productive sector thus responds to reforms
that induce changes in overall labor supply and in its allocation between the formal and informal
sectors of the economy.
The demographic module feeds the other three modules with the projection of population
growth and demographic patterns (mortality/birth rates for each age/sex cohort). It provides
information on the size of  cohorts needed to calculate employment  in the labor module.
The model is thus able to take into account the links between the socio-economic factors
which determine the balance of the fund in the short-  and medium-term.  It also represents an
attempt to quantify the feedback effects of policy changes in the area of social security on labor
market equilibrium, fiscal balance, savings and investment, and more generally on the growth
path of the economy.
B.  Stabilization and Economic Reforms: Prospects.
The point of departure of the analysis is the current situation. The macroeconomic
environment can be briefly described as follows:  average monthly inflation rates have now
fallen to about 1 percent and have remained at that level since the beginning of 1996; the budget
deficit is expected to be below 4 percent of GDP; the exchange rate is stabilized but  GDP is still
falling (a negative growth rate of about 8 percent is expected).  In terms of structural reforms,
most domestic prices have been freed, trade has been liberalized, and about half of small-scale
privatization has been completed.
The basic assumption for the coming years is that the government will continue to
maintain a tight monetary and fiscal policy and will pursue its reform efforts.  The budget deficit
will be contained at 3-4 percent of GDP and inflation will fall to less than 10 percent a year by
2000.  Structural reforms aimed at developing the private sector will be implemented steadily.
They include completion of small-scale privatization; progress in privatization of medium- and
large-scale enterprises and agricultural land; imposition of hard-budget constraints to remaining
state-owned enterprises; full liberalization of trade; and a gradual reduction in the size of the
budgetary sector. Under these assumptions, Ukraine could take full advantage of its natural and
human resources as well as of the existing infrastructure. Growth could resume from 1997 on,
starting with a modest rate of the order of  2 percent in 1997, followed by  an average of 6
percent during the next three years,  and  a  return to 4-5  percent after the turn of the century.
Real wage growth would follow a similar path although growth rates would have to be slightly
lower to take into account some growth of the labor force.14
C.  Demographic Trends: An Aging Population
The Ukrainian population is expected to grow older over the next 35 years. The average
rate of population growth is projected to be 0.24 percent a year. This long-term growth rate is
much smaller than world average, but comparable to other FSU countries (see Tables in
Appendix B).  Given life expectancy patterns, the percentage of people over the age of 60, the
current retirement age for men (for women it is 55), is expected to increase from about 18
percent today to 25 percent in the year 2030.
Given these demographic trends, the old-age dependency ratio, defined as the ratio of the
population over the age 60 (55 for women) over the population with ages 20 - 59 (or 20-55 for
women),  is expected to increase from the current level of 49 percent to almost 59 percent by the
year 2030.  It is unlikely that these demographic trends will be greatly altered by economic or
political developments.  As under the current Pension Law, everyone over the legal retirement
age is eligible for some kind of pension,  demographic factors will  put pressure on the balance of
the Pension Fund in the long run.
D.  Labor Market Trends
From a demographic point of view the old age dependency ratio is measured as the
population aged 60+ (55+ for women) over the population of working age. However, for the
purpose of the analysis of the balance of the pension fund, the relevant ratio is the ratio of the
population eligible for pensions over the number of contributors among the population of
working age (system dependency ratio). Given the changes in labor force participation and
allocation of time between informal and formal sectors and thus, the reduction in the number of
contributors, this ratio is currently equal to about 120 percent 6, that is, almost 2.5 times the
demographic ratio. In other words, the number of pensioners now exceeds by a significant
margin the number of contributors to the PAYG system.
How this ratio will change over time depends both upon the demographic trends
described above and upon the changes in the labor market that will continue to take place as a
response to market signals. As a starting point, the assumption is made that the sharp increase
observed in activity rates both at early and post-retirement ages is linked to the substantial
decline in living standards experienced during the transition, and is thus, mostly an income effect
As the economy recovers these activity rates would progressively decline at both ends of the age
distribution. However, they would not return to their past levels. At young ages, two factors
6  A large discrepancy  between  the system  dependency  ratio and the demographic  dependency  ratio can also  be
found in other  countries  such as Argentina,  Hungary  or Latvia,  where  extensive  tax evasion  and early  retirement
also exist  (see Vittas 1995  and Fox,  Palmer  & Mclssac 1996). In both  Argentina  and Hungary,  the system
dependency  ratio is nearly  double  the demographic  ratio. In Latvia  as in Ukraine,  it is more  than double.  The extent
of tax evasion  and informalization  of productive  activities  is thus particularly  high in the latter  two  countries.15
would have opposite effects: on the one hand, growth and increasing returns to education (as the
economy restructures) would induce a recovery of school enrollment rates; on the other hand the
likely increase in the cost of access to education compared to Soviet times would prevent the
restoration of past levels of enrollment.  It is therefore assumed that the activity rates of youth
would gradually converge toward the average level observed in European countries.  At post-
retirement ages,  assuming in the base scenario that the eligibility rule for pensions is not
modified, rates would also decline as a response to improvements in living standards.  However,
they would not  return to previous levels if the recovery of wages (and thus of pension levels)
remains slow even under the hypothesis of  fairly rapid growth.  Indeed if real wages grow in line
with GDP, wage levels would still be at about 60 percent of their 1990 levels by 2005.
With respect to activity rates between the ages of 20 and 60 for males (or between 20 and
55 in the case of women) the main assumption is that male labor force participation rates will
remain roughly the same (and therefore similar to what they were in the past). Female activity
rates between the ages of 20 and 55 however would decline slightly and become similar to those
observed in Western Europe. It is expected that the development of the private sector will entail
the loss ofjob  security and the reduction of non-pecuniary benefits typical of public
employment, which made it easier for women in the past to combine work with child raising
activities.
The crucial factor for the sustainability of the Pension Fund, however, is not so much the
evolution of labor activity rates but the relative importance of the informal economy and tax
evasion.  As a starting point in the base scenario, the assumption is made that the share of
employment in the formnal  sector will remain at its current level (.60) over the next few years.
However, as will be discussed in more details later this hypothesis appears unrealistic as three
factors point to a further expansion of the informal sector unless policy changes are introduced.
First, the high payroll tax provides strong incentives to employers to evade tax payments.
Second, the recently introduced changes (compression of pension levels) have loosened the link
between contributions and benefits and have consequently changed the social security
contribution into a pure tax on labor. There is little incentive to contribute to a fund when
expected benefits are not connected to contributions.  Third,  labor adjustment has just started in
Ukraine with little labor flows out of state-owned enterprises into private enterprises or into self-
employment.  As both self-employment and  the private sector expand,  the possibility and
likelihood of tax evasion will increase.  The analysis will show the sensitivity of  results to
changes in assumptions regarding the size of the informal economy.
4.2.  Could all the original features of the old-age benefit scheme be restored if the economy is
back on a growth path ?
Restoring the original features of the pension system would essentially mean increasing
gradually the replacement ratio and the range of payments, reintroducing at least partially some16
link between contributions and benefits.7 Current eligibility rules, including the early retirement
age and the redistributive component in favor of those who have contributed little or nothing to
the pension fund would be maintained.
Reintroducing some link between contributions and benefits would reduce the incentives
toward tax evasion and  the informalization of production.  However, it would not eliminate them
as the very high rate of taxation and  the redistributive component of the system would remain.
It is unlikely that the relative size of the informal sector would decrease significantly, given, in
particular, the substantial labor reallocation toward the private sector and self-employment that is
still expected to take place.
Simulations show that, even in the case of resumption of sustainable growth, the weight
of demographic trends and a persistently high system dependency ratio would impinge on the
balance of the pension fund. Assuming that the share of the informal sector remains constant,
attempting to gradually increase the replacement ratio from about 30 percent in 1996 to about 50
percent by 2030 would make the deficit of the fund gradually grow from  less than 1 percent of
GDP in 1996 to over 3 percent in 2000 and  7 percent by 2010, threatening fiscal adjustment and
stabilization (see Scenario 1). A very substantial reallocation of the labor force away from the
informal sector into the formal sector, with positive feedback effect on growth would be needed
to alter the results.  Simulations show that almost 1  00 percent of the labor force would need to be
employed in the formal sector and contributing to the fund to achieve a balance of the pension
fund under these conditions (see Scenario 2).
,Attempting  to restore the past generous features of the  pension system, in particular
granting to pensioners a higher level of social protection (relative to wage-earners) than what
they receive  today does not appear as a  realistic policy option, even if there is resumption of
growth. Such an option would not be consistent with a continuous effort to maintain
macroeconomic stability.
4.3  Would maintaining the "status quo" be sustainable ?
If restoring the past features of the social security system does not appear fiscally
sustainable,  would maintaining the current features - including the recent policy changes -be  a
more realistic policy option ?  In other words, could Ukraine maintain a highly redistributive
pension system, practically a social  safety net (or social assistance) system,  with a wide
coverage but providing modest benefits ?
7  Increasing  the range  of payments  would  necessarily  imply  raising  the replacement  ratio as it would  be impossible
for social  and  political  reasons  to lower  the minimum  pension.17
Scenario 1. Grdually  restoring early-9Os  replacement  ratios with constant share of informal sector
1995  1996  1997  1998  2000  2005  2010  2020  2030
PAYG  Pension  Fund  (% of formal  GDP)
Payroll  contributions  8.43  9.04  9.36  9.51  9.64  9.88  10.12  10.65  10.76
Total expenditure  8.49  9.61  10.79  11.63  13.02  16.25  17.31  18.46  19.04
Fund  balance  -0.06  -0.57  -1.43  -2.12  -3.37  -6.37  -7.18  -7.81  -8.28
Average  replacement  ratio  29%  29%  31%  33%  37%  46%  47%  46%  49%
Dependency  ratio  111%  120%  120%  119%  118%  117%  118%  121%  117%
Share  of formal  sector  employment  59%  59%  59%  59%  59%  59%  59%  59%  59%
Scenario 2. Gradually restoring early-90s replacement  ratios with declining informal sector
1995  1996  1997  1998  2000  2005  2010  2020  2030
PAYG  Pension  Fund  (% of formal  GDP)
Payroll  contributions  8.43  9.02  9.95  10.52  11.25  12.91  14.03  15.80  16.43
Totalexpenditure  8.48  9.62  10.46  11.19  12.24  14.51  15.14  15.95  16.44
Fund  balance  -0.06  -0.59  -0.52  -0.67  -0.99  -1.60  -1.10  -0.15  -0.01
Average  replacement  ratio  28.6%  29%  31%  34%  38%  47%  48%  48%  50%
Dependency  ratio  110.8%  120%  108%  101%  92%  78%  72%  68%  65%
Share  of formal  sector  employment  59%  59%  66%  70%  75%  88%  96%  99%  99%
Note:  This  is  a 'what-if'  scenario  In  the  sense  that  there  is  no  economic  rationale  for  an  increasing  formal  sector.
The  share  of  informal  sector  Is  set arbitrarily  so  that  the  Pension  Fund  will  remain  roughly  balanced.
Scenario 3. Maintaining the "status quo" - replacement  ratio practically constant
1995  1996  1997  1998  2000  2005  2010  2020  2030
PAYG  Pension  Fund  (% of formal  GDP)
Payroll  contributions  8.43  9.04  9.36  9.51  9.64  9.88  10.12  10.65  10.76
Total expenditure  8.49  9.61  10.03  10.49  10.77  10.89  11.18  11.94  12.03
Fund  balance  -0.06  -0.57  -0.67  -0.99  -1.12  -1.00  -1.05  -1.28  -1.27
Average  replacement  ratio  29%  29%  29%  30%  30%  30%  30%  30%  31%
Dependency  ratio  110.8%  120%  120%  119%  118%  117%  118%  121%  117%
Share  of formal  sector  employment  59%  59%  59%  59%  59%  59%  59%  59%  59%18
It is obvious that, ceterisparibus, this option could be fiscally sustainable.  Maintaining
the replacement ratio at about one third of the average wage would imply that pensions grow in
real terms at the same rate than wages.  If the share of the formal sector were to remain
practically constant, the balance of the pension fund would depend mainly on two sets of factors
working in opposite directions.  Demographic factors would worsen the situation.  On the other
hand, the gradual decline of hidden unemployment in the formal sector through labor shedding
S would reduce the number of beneficiaries of old-age pensions . Simulations show that, in such a
case, the deficit of the pension fund would remain around 1 percent of GDP, which could be
accomodated without jeopardizing fiscal adjustment (see Scenario 3).
Such conclusion, however, fails to consider that the whole incentive framework inducing
an increase in the informal sector would remain in place. The formal sector would remain heavily
taxed and the link between contributions and benefits would remain loose inducing  substantial
income redistribution within cohorts.  Enterprises would still be induced to shift operations to
informal markets and to use less labor-intensive technologies.  From the point of view of
individual workers, the system would remain actuarially unfair.  Chart 3  illustrates this point.
It compares the present value of contributions with the present value of expected pensions for
men and women who spend 30 years of their working life in the formal sector and have a length
of life determined by the average life expectancy for the whole population.  The calculation is
made for workers with various wage levels at the time of exit from the labor force and assumes a
3 percent average annual real wage growth and a 3 percent real interest rate.  These estimates
show that all male workers, irrespective of their wage levels, could expect to receive less than 20
cents for every dollar of contribution. Women would receive  somewhat more -between 20-35
cents per dollar -both because of their earlier retirement age and longer life expectancy. 9 In any
case, the large redistributive component makes it unlikely that workers would  willingly
contribute to the fund.
As a result, assuming that the fund would remain balanced by maintaining the "status
quo" would be highly unrealistic. Indeed, a small shift of the labor force away from the formal
sector would immediately threaten the balance of the fund.  For example, if only 50 percent of
the labor force instead of 60 percent were to contribute to the fund,  the fund deficit would
increase to over 2 percent of GDP.
Savings  would  be limited  as those not eligible  for standard  old-age  pensions  would  become  eligible  for minimum
pensions  or social  pensions.
These  calculations  are sensitive  to the assumptions  made on real  wage growth  and real interest  rate. For
exarnple,  for a 5% wage growth  and a 3% interest  rate, female  workers  could expect  to receive  25-45  cents  per
dollar  of contribution.  Inversely  with a 3%  wage growth  and a 5%  interest  rate, the return  would  only be 15-25
cents  per dollar.19
Chart  3.  Ratio  of Present  Value  of Expected  Pensions  over  Present
Value  of 30 Years  of Contribution  at Time  of Retirement
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note:  assuming  rate  of  real  wage  increase  = 3%,  real  interest  rate  = 3%,
life  expectancy  = 65 for men,  73 for  women.
An additional element to take into consideration is the high probability of  lack of
confidence and  social support that such a policy option would  entail.  Even with sustained
growth  for a period of over 20 years, the livings standards of the population would improve
slowly. Given the 60 percent fall in real wages between 1990 and 1995, real wages would not
recover their 1990 level before 2020, that is, after about 25 years.  During all that period,
pensions would remain at 30 percent of a depressed level.
Thus one has to conclude that the changes recently introduced in the pension system - if
made permanent - would not constitute a valid medium- and long-term reform option.  The main
reason is that the whole set of incentives favorable to the development of the informal sector
would remain in place.
V.  The Need for Reforms
The simulations presented above clearly show that, either attempting to restore all past
features of the pension system or even simply maintaining the "statu quo" are not viable options
- even in the context of resumption of growth.  Ruling out these options implies that reforms are
necessary. This section examines various options and attempts to measure their impact.20
5.1.  Reforms of Limited Scope.
Previous studies of the Ukraine pension system (e.g., World Bank, 1994; IMF, 1996;
Kane, 1996) have identified and recommended a number of short- and medium-term reforms
which have as main objective to ensure fiscal sustainability.  The proposed  measures either aim
at saving resources or at improving collection of  revenues. The first set includes reducing
pensions for working pensioners, establishing a uniform maximum pension (that is, eliminating
some privileges for several categories of pensioners) and raising the retirement age.  The second
set of measures aims at raising revenues through enforcement of tax payments, the inclusion of
income-in-kind in the taxable wage base, and the extension of the obligation to pay the 32
percent payroll tax to those engaged in entrepreneurial activity.  In the medium-term, the main
recommendations are to base the level of  pensions on years of  contributions rather than on years
of service, and to increase the spread among pensions in order to restore some link between
contributions and benefits.
The most significant of these measures is likely to be the increase in the retirement age.
Simulations discussed below will show its impact. All the other short-term measures - although
in the right direction - are unlikely to have a significant impact as they fail to take into
consideration the main factors that make the whole system unsustainable.  For example, raising
the effective tax rate by including income-in-kind and improving tax enforcement may encounter
enormous difficulties as the incentives to informalize productive activities will be even greater
than before.  Such measures would be more effective if  introduced when distortions affecting
labor supply and occupational choice are reduced or removed.
As for the increase in the spread among pensions, it amounts to raising the level of  the
maximum pension as it would be socially and politically impossible to lower the minimum
pension which is currently only equal to about 20 percent of the average wage.  Thus the average
replacement ratio would increase. Simulations presented in the last section showed that, even
with sustained growth, this would make the deficit of the pension fund grow rapidly in the
absence of other reforms.
Raising the retirement age is often a difficult political decision which receives little public
support.  Most countries who take that decision opt for a gradual increase.  Some, however -such
as Georgia among FSU countries - choose to implement the change in one shot.  To compare
the different cases, various simulations have been run (see Scenarios 4-9).  In Scenario 4,
retirement age is raised from 60 to 65 for men, and from 55 to 60 for women in 1997. In
Scenario 5, a further increase to age 65 is assumed for women.  In addition in both scenarios,
privileges given to certain categories of workers who can retire before the formal retirement age21
are reduced though not fully eliminated.1° In both cases, there is no attempt to remove
retroactively the rights of those who retired earlier. The third simulation (Scenario 6) assumes a
more gradual increase in retirement age. All three scenarios assume that, with economic
recovery, the Government will attempt to improve the standards of living of pensioners and raise
gradually the replacement ratio to reach about 50 percent by 2030.
10  The closing of mines and restructuring of large enterprises is expected to lead to early retirement for certain
categories of workers and may prevent a complete elimination of rights to early retirement. Howver,a complete
elimination of these rights is envisaged in Scenario 9.22
Scenario  4.  Increasing  retirement  age  (men  to 65, women  to 60)  with increasing  replacement  ratio
1995  1996  1997  1998  2000  2005  2010  2020  2030
PAYG Pension  Fund  (% of  formal  GDP)
Payroll  contributions  8.43  9.11  9.54  9.77  10.05  10.54  10.85  11.36  11.48
Total  expenditure  8.49  9.63  10.77  11.57  12.65  14.18  14.76  16.20  16.92
Fund  balance  -0.06  -0.52  -1.24  -1.80  -2.60  -3.64  -3.91  -4.84  -5.44
Average  replacement  ratio  29%  29%  31%  34%  37%  45%  46%  45%  48%
Dependency  ratio  111%  119%  116%  113%  108%  96%  95%  101%  100%
Share of  formal  sectoremployment  59%  59%  59%  60%  60%  61%  61%  61%  61%
Note:  Retirement  age  increases  by  one  year  each  year  from  1997  to 2001  so  that  men  aged  59 and  women  aged  54 in 1996  will
retire  in 2002.
Scenario  S. Increasing  retirement ages  to 65 with increasing replacement  ratio
1995  1996  1997  1998  2000  2005  2010  2020  2030
PAYG  Pension  Fund  (% of  formal  GDP)
Payroll  contributions  8.43  9.22  9.62  9.84  10.12  10.68  11.01  11.51  11.61
Total expenditure  8.49  9.64  10.72  11.47  12.42  13.13  12.90  13.88  14.42
Fund  balance  -0.06  -0.43  -1.10  -1.63  -2.30  -2.45  -1.90  -2.37  -2.81
Average  replacement  ratio  29%  29%  31%  34%  38%  47%  49%  48%  50%
Dependency  ratio  111%  117%  114%  110%  104%  84%  78%  82%  81%
Share  of formal  sector  employment  59%  59%  59%  60%  60%  61%  62%  61%  62%
Note:  Retirement  age  increases  by  one  year  each  year  from  1997  to 2001  for  men,  to 2006  for  women.
Scenario  6.  Gradual  increases  of retirement  ages  (see note below)  with increasing  replacement  ratio
1995  1996  1997  1998  2000  2005  2010  2020  2030
PAYG  Pension  Fund  (% of formal  GDP)
Payroll  contributions  8.43  9.24  9.65  9.89  10.18  10.74  11.10  11.61  11.68
Total  expenditure  8.49  9.64  10.72  11.64  12.77  13.37  12.92  13.99  14.70
Fund  balance  -0.06  -0.40  -1.07  -1.76  -2.60  -2.62  -1.83  -2.38  -3.01
Average  replacement  ratio  29%  29%  31%  34%  38%  47%  48%  48%  50%
Dependency  ratio  111%  117%  114%  111%  106%  86%  77%  81%  80%
Share  of formal  sector  employment  59%  59%  59%  60%  60%  61%  62%  61%  62%
Note:  Retirement  age  increases  gradually  (by  two  years  each  year)  to 65  for  men  and  60  for  women  at the  end  of 1996,  and  then
then  retirement  age  for  women  increases  gradually  to  65. So  that  men  aged  59 in 1996  will  retire  at the  age  of  61  in 1998,  and
those  58  in 1996  will  retire  at  the  age  of  62 in 2000,  and  so  on.23
Scenario  7. Increasing  retirement  ages  to 65  with replacement  ratio  practically  constant
1995  1996  1997  1998  2000  2005  2010  2020  2030
PAYG Pension  Fund (% of formal GDP)
Payroll  contributions  8.43  9.22  9.63  9.87  10.17  10.77  11.13  11.66  11.75
Total expenditure  8.48  9.64  10.14  10.36  10.29  8.69  8.29  9.00  9.24
Fund balance  -0.06  -0.42  -0.51  -0.49  -0.12  2.08  2.84  2.67  2.51
Average  replacement  ratio  28.6%  29%  30%  31%  31%  31%  31%  31%  31%
Dependency  ratio  110.8%  117%  114%  110%  103%  83%  77%  81%  80%
Share of formal sector employment  59%  59%  59%  60%  60%  60%  60%  60%  60%
Note:  Retirement  age increases  by  one  year  each  year  from  1997  to 2001  for men,  to 2006  for women.
Scenario 8.  Increasing retirement ages to 65 with declining formal sector and constant replacement ratio
1995  1996  1997  1998  2000  2005  2010  2020  2030
PAYG Pension  Fund (% of formal GDP)
Payroll  contributions  8.43  9.22  9.63  9.80  9.88  9.29  9.27  9.63  9.64
Total  expenditure  8.49  9.20  9.97  10.39  10.41  9.23  8.91  9.66  9.93
Fund balance  -0.06  0.02  -0.34  -0.59  -0.53  0.07  0.37  -0.03  -0.29
Averagereplacementratio  28.6%  28%  29%  31%  31%  31%  31%  31%  31%
Dependency  ratio  110.8%  117%  114%  111%  108%  103%  99%  105%  105%
Share of formal sector  employment  59%  59%  59%  59%  57%  49%  46%  45%  45%
Note:  This  is a "what-ir  scenano  in the  sense  that no  rationale  is provided  for dedining  formal  sector.
Scenario 9.  Increasing retirement ages to 65 (with elimination of early retirements) and Increasing replacement ratio
1995  1996  1997  1998  2000  2005  2010  2020  2030
PAYG Pension  Fund (% of formal GDP)
Payroll  contributions  8.43  9.22  9.62  9.84  10.12  10.68  11.01  11.51  11.61
Total expenditure  8.49  9.64  10.60  11.21  11.84  12.45  11.90  12.76  13.38
Fund balance  -0.06  -0.43  -0.98  -1.37  -1.73  -1.77  -0.89  -1.25  -1.76
Average replacement  ratio  29%  29%  31%  34%  38%  47%  48%  47%  49%
Dependency  ratio  111%  117%  113%  108%  99%  80%  72%  75%  75%
Share of formal sector  employment  59%  59%  59%  60%  60%  61%  62%  61%  61  %
Note:  Retirement  age increases  by  one  year  each  year  from 1997  to 2001  for men,  to 2006  for women.
All three simulations show that raising the retirement age has a significant financial
impact. However, it would not generate sufficient savings to compensate for the additional
expenditures that the desired increase in the overall level of pensions relative to wages would24
imply.  In other words the savings generated by retirement at a later age would not allow the
Government to increase significantly the replacement ratio.  If the Government aims at a 50
percent replacement ratio, the deficit of the pension fimd would be significant in the long run
(over 5 percent of GDP if the retirement age for women is raised to 60, and about 3 percent of
GDP if it is raised to 65).  It is worth noting that these results are obtained under a set of
favorable circumstances as the simulations assume no further increase in the informal sector.  In
fact, the increase in the spread  among pensions and the increased level of pensions would induce
a small increase in the formal sector and a higher growth rate.
Because of the long life expectancy of women in Ukraine, raising their retirement age to
65 rather than to 60 makes a significant difference: the long-terrn deficit is reduced by nearly 50
percent. This points to the need to consider 65 as the most appropriate retirement age.
Whether the increase in retirement age is gradual or immediate does not matter in the long
run, but of course matters in the short run. A sharp increase would thus have the advantage of
easing the fiscal adjustment during the early years of the transition.  It is also worth considering
that the political difficulty of introducing such a reform may be significantly lower"' when the
labor force participation rates of older people are high as it is the case now in Ukraine.
The remaining simulations presented in  Scenarios 7 & 8  assume an increase in the
retirement age combined with a more modest increase in the level of pensions.  Pension increases
follow  the path of real wages so as to maintain the replacement ratio practically constant.  In
such case, an increase in the retirement age would generate a surplus after the turn of the century
provided the share of the formal sector remains practically constant (Scenario 7).  However even
a modest reallocation of labor toward the informal sector - 55 percent of the labor force instead
of  the current 40 percent - would be sufficient to wipe out the surplus (see Scenario 8).  Finally
Scenario 9 envisages to accompany the increase in pension age by a radical elimination of rights
to early retirement.  As could be expected,  Scenario 9 shows a decline in the fund's deficit
(compared to the deficit in scenario 5) but no elimination.
This exercise clearly shows that, however significant and necessary is the increase in the
retirement age, it cannot by itself ensure the sustainability of the pension system and more
radical reforms are needed.
5.2.  More Radical Reforms: Transition toward Fully -Funded Systems
The analysis presented above leads to two conclusions. First, in the absence of reforms
the financial situation of the pension system will worsen  - even if the economy returns to a
1  l Such  a measure  was introduced  in Georgia  in January 1996,  precisely  at a time  when  pensions  were considerably
reduced  and older  people  were forced  to rely on other  sources  of income  (such  as work)  to cover their basic  needs.
12 unless,  of course,  the Government  continues  to adjust downward  the level of benefits.25
sustainable growth path.  Second, reforms that fail to change the incentive framework appear
doomed to failure.  The strong incentive to informalize production and avoid taxation is also
linked to the lack of credibility of government policies and mistrust of the overall population
toward state-managed programs that failed to provide protection to vulnerable population groups
during the transition.  This explains why private sector initiative to supplement falling official
benefits has increased rapidly in Ukraine as it did in Russia.  Almost 20 private pension funds are
now in operation in Ukraine in spite of the absence of a regulatory and legislative framework that
could provide some protection to those who deposit their savings in those funds.
The fact that private sector initiative is developing independently points undoubtedly to
the need to put in place urgently the necessary legislative and regulatory framework. It also
indicates that there is no longer need for a public social security system that would attempt to
cover all needs for old-age security.  Reforms should thus consider a mix of public and private
responsibilities.  Although this paper focuses on the restructuring of the public scheme,  it
assumes that the promotion of private voluntary pension schemes through the establishment of an
appropriate legislative framework would be part of the overall social security reforms in Ukraine.
The most obvious reform to consider for the public scheme would be the introduction of a
fully-funded system (see Corsetti & Schmidt-Hebbel, 1995; Vittas, 1995). Such pension
arrangement implies that each generation pays for its own retirement through the buildup of a
stock of capital during their working years. The major benefit of such system is that it establishes
a clear link between contributions and benefits as each worker has an account in which his/her
savings are accumulated and draws on this account at a later stage of his life.  This reduces the
incentives to avoid the burden of the payroll tax by shifting to informal activities or
underreporting wages.  Although one could also restore a link between contributions and benefits
under a PAYG system with an appropriate pension formula, the link would remain weaker due in
particular to intra-generational income redistribution.  The incentives to participate in the share
of the formal economy would thus be greater with a funded scheme.  One could also expect that a
funded scheme would contribute more effectively to restoring credibility and trust as it could be
privately managed (although subject to public regulations).  Confidence is an another important
factor that can induce a larger share of labor working in the formal sector and less tax evasion.
Other benefits of a funded system would be a shift toward long-term financial savings
which would contribute to the development of capital markets, and a likely positive impact on
the overall rate of saving. In addition the adoption of a defined-contribution program would
imply a minimal  risk of government involvement.
A.  Transition Paths: Tradeoffs and Policy Issues.
Shifting from a PAYG to a funded system entails creating a transition deficit as the
contributions of those enrolling under the new plan are no longer available to pay for the26
pensions of current retirees. The financial responsibility for the obligations toward current
pensioners is gradually shifted to the government thus reducing -pari passu - the liabilities of the
pension system.  To finance the transition costs the government can either issue new government
debt and/or use budget surpluses (raising taxes or reducing public spending).
There is obviously some flexibility in the design of a transition path.  The final choice of
a particular path and the associated cost depend to a large extent on the way several issues -
some of them potentially of significant political sensitivity - are addressed.  Critical decisions
need in particular, to be taken regarding the rights to guarantee to pensioners covered under the
old system; the level at which the contribution rate will be set under the new plan; and the
distribution of the fiscal burden of the transition between generations.  In addition, the
government must decide whether the new fund will be made responsible for the payment of
social or minimum pensions. The design and choice of a particular transition path thus implies
taking decisions which can affect several generations of workers and pensioners in different
ways.  They can also have different implications regarding  savings, capital formation and
growth.
In the following various transition paths - with their associated costs -will be examined.
They correspond to alternative ways of addressing the foregoing issues taking into account
factors specific to Ukraine. In no way, these simulations pretend to cover all possible cases, in
particular in terms of timing and speed of implementation of the reform. The objective is mainly
to underline the trade-offs and examine the most critical elements.
All simulations (see Scenarios 10-16) assume that the transition to a mandatory funded
system would start in 199713  with the cohort of younger workers (aged 15-29) contributing to the
new fund.  Thus in 1998, workers aged 15-30 would be enrolled in the new plan and so on... It is
therefore only at the end of the 35-year projection period that all workers in the labor force would
be enrolled.  Since the analysis made in an earlier section made clear that increasing the
retirement age was a necessary component of any reform of the social security system in
Ukraine, all simulations assume an increase in the retirement age up to 65 for both men and
women.  In addition, it is expected that credibility of reforms will gradually build up and that
changes in the incentive framework will induce an increase in the share of the formal sector in
total employment.  However, given the difficulty to predict the speed and magnitude of the
behavioral changes all scenarios assume a response lag and only a moderate growth of the share
of the formal sector. By 2030 still a little less than 3/4 of the labor force would be in the formal
sector.
13  The choice of 1997 is arbitrary.  Delaying implementation by a few years would not affect the conclusions of
the analysis.27
Finally all simulations assume that, at least in the early years, the assets of the funded tier
will mostly comprise government-issued bonds. The diversification of assets in the fund's
portfolio will take place gradually as the financial sector strengthens and develops.  The
possibility for the government to borrow fromr  the funded tier  to cover its obligations toward
current pensioners (or part of them) makes possible the introduction of the new pension plan
without short-term fiscal impact.  There is just an exchange of  cash for government debt, and
even the interest of the debt is assumed to be paid  by issuing new debt during the period of
analysis (the first outlays from the funded tier are not expected to take place before 35 years
when the first cohort retires under the new system).  An alternative is of course to allow the
funded tier to diversify its assets at an earlier stage. This could increase the public support for
the reform but the fiscal cost and thus the burden on the current generation would also greatly
increase.
Scenarios vary in the following:
(i) Rights guaranteed to current pensioners.  It is obvious that the cost of the transition to
a funded system will be smaller, the smaller the benefits provided to current pensioners.
However, it is important to consider in the case of Ukraine that, over recent years, pensioners
have already been subject to a significant reduction in their levels of benefits.  Introducing a
reform that would imply a further reduction of benefits to one-fourth of the population, could be
extremely difficult for social and political reasons, especially at a time of economic recovery.
Such case is not examined in this paper. Two options will therefore be considered: (a) indexing
pensions over real wage growth which would maintain the replacement ratio at its current level;
or (b) indexing pensions on changes in the price level, which would lead to a lower and
decreasing replacement ratio.  A more generous solution, amounting to a significant increase in
the replacement ratio, is ruled out.  As shown earlier it would imply a significant deficit even in
the absence of reforms.  The choice between options (a) and (b) depends on consideration of
costs and equity.
(ii) Contribution rate.  Maintaining high payroll taxes while reducing labor market
distortions through a stronger link between contributions and benefits would help creating a
surplus under the PAYG system. This could lower the transition costs.  However, there is little
justification for a 33 percent forced savings rate under a funded system.  A lower rate would
leave room for individual choices and enrollment in voluntary private plans. With a reduction in
tax evasion and the internalization  of benefits a funded system would reduce (or eliminate) the
redistributive component.  The same replacement ratio could be achieved with a lower
contribution rate.  All these considerations  - in addition to the objective of reducing tax evasion -
point into the direction of lowering the contribution rate.  The question is then to decide by how
much and how rapidly, and for whom (workers under the old or the new system).  This also has
significant distributional and fiscal implications.28
Simulations will consider several contribution rates (33, 23,17 and 10 percent) allowing
for some comparison. When a reduction is envisaged, it will either be gradual (by one
percentage point every year), or at once in 1997. The choice of the range 17-23 percent is based
on the assumption that the acceptability of the reform will be greater if those enrolling under the
new plan can expect higher pension levels than under the current plan.  This will be discussed
further below.  Choosing 10 percent would reduce the mandatory scheme and leave more room
for additional voluntary private plans.
(iii) Distribution of the  fiscal  burden between generations. As pensioners enrolled under
the new plan will enjoy  larger benefits'4 than current pensioners for a given contribution rate,
one could envisage to partially tax the former to reduce the transition deficit.  The forced
redistribution from current workers to current pensioners would remain compensated by higher
expected benefits. Two alternative ways of doing so are examined.  The first amounts to have all
members of the labor force - whether belonging to the new or the old plan - benefit from a
gradual decline in the contribution rate (from 33 to 23 percent by 2010).  However, over the
whole period, those enrolled under the new plan would only accumulate 22 percent'5 into their
accounts. The difference -an amount decreasing over time - would help finance the transition
costs. The other alternative is to lower the contribution rate to 23 percent for all workers but at
once in 1997. Workers affiliated to the new plan would however only accumulate 17 percent of
their wages into the fund. Over the whole period, 5 percentage points would be redistributed
toward current payments of pensions.
Social and Minimum Guaranteed Pensions. The remaining important issues are the
treatment to be given to social pensions and whether a minimum pension should be guaranteed to
those who have only contributed for a few years to the fund.  Social pensions are a clear
component of a safety net. One question - often debated -is whether this type of pensions should
be financed out of payroll taxes or general tax revenues, and whether it should be given to all or
subject to means-testing.  One could easily argue that it would be preferable to shift all social
assistance payments to the budget in order to eliminate the distortionary effects of the payroll tax.
However, in the current circumstances social pensions are low in Ukraine - equal to about 18
percent of the average wage.  Given the likely labor market and macroeconomic scenarios, less
than 1 percent of the total payroll tax is (and will be) needed for their payment.  Keeping social
pensions as a liability of the pension system does not appear to have significant financial
implications as long as current regulations remain in effect.
14 A significant  notch can be expected  at the time of retirement  of workers  enrolled  under  the new plan. While
pensioners  under  the PAYG  system  can expect  a replacement  ratio of the order of .3 with  a 33 percent contribution,
those adhering  to new plan could  reach a ratio of .8 with similar  contribution  provided  the rate of interest  is equal  to
the rate of real wage growth.
is  The one percent  difference  between  23 and 22 percent  would  be used for the payment  of social  pensions  as
explained  in the next paragraph.29
Deciding on a minimum guaranteed old-age pension depends on whether a first pillar -
mostly redistributive- would be maintained in addition to the funded system.  Most countries -
such as Chile -which do not have a first PAYG pillar have a guaranteed minimum pension.  In
the rest of the analysis, we will proceed under this assumption and maintain the same level for
both minimum and social pensions. One percent of the payroll tax will be kept for that
redistributive purpose.
B.  Simulation Results
Maintaining pensions indexed on real wage growth and a 33 percent contribution rate
while raising the retirement age and benefiting from an increase in formal sector employment
would generate a surplus within a few years (Scenario 10). As of 2000 total contributions
(including those to the funded tier) could exceed expenditures. The surplus although small at the
start, would reach almost 4 percent of GDP by 2005. In spite of this surplus, a significant amount
of debt would need to be issued: by 2000 the amount of debt would reach 10 percent of GDP and
about 128 percent by 2030, assuming a 3 percent real interest rate.'6
Lowering the contribution rate to 23 percent at the start of the implementation of the
reform would, ceteris paribus, generate a deficit in early years (Scenario 11).  The stock of
government debt to the funded tier would reach 7 percent of GDP by 2000 and would be equal to
149 percent at the end of the period.  It is interesting to observe that a gradual lowering of the
payroll tax (by one percentage point every year for 10 years) - instead of an immediate drop -
would make practically no difference in terms of total debt accumulation (Scenario 12).  The
differential impact in terms of lower debt would only be noticeable in the early years when the
stock of debt is still small. Both scenarios however differ in terms of their impact on the
government's budget deficit. Lowering the contribution at once creates in the early years, a
deficit which exceeds the endowment needed for the newly created fund.  This difference needed
to pay for current pensions (around 3 percent of GDP until 2000 and still slightly negative until
2005) would necessarily have to be financed out of the budget, either by raising other taxes or by
cutting public spending.  This option may therefore be more difficult to implement in the context
of a tight expenditure program unless the sudden lowering of the tax is accompanied by some
other measure, such as a reduction in pension levels, which would lower expenditures.
A modest surplus could be restored by indexing pensions on prices rather than on real
wage growth while reducing the contribution rate. This would reduce somewhat the burden
passed on future generations.  In this case, the overall debt would accumulate to about 127
percent of GDP by 2030 (Scenario 13).
16  It is assumed that the service of the debt is covered by issuing new debt.30
Scenario 10. Starting the funded tier with the genertion  younger than 30 In 1997,
increasing retirement ages to 65 and maintaining a 33%  tax rat
1995  1996  1997  1998  2000  2005  2010  2020  2030
As % of formal  GDP
Payroll  contributions  (all)  8.43  9.14  9.42  9.96  10.62  11.97  12.40  13.12  13.42
Total PAYG  expenditure  8.49  9.64  9.99  10.23  10.32  8.30  8.28  8.99  8.98
Balance  -0.06  -0.50  -0.57  -0.27  0.30  3.67  4.12  4.12  4.44
Funded  Tier  (trillions  of Kbv.,  curr. price)
Total  assets  (stock)  198  514  1629  8867  28232  175051  765451
Gov't  borrowing  from Funded  tier  256  315  477  414  1364  8326  28228
(as  % of formal  GDP)  2.5%  2.6%  2.8%  1.4%  2.8%  6.4%  8.3%
Stock  of govt debt  256  614  1731  4857  12603  88118  438412
(as  % of formal  GDP)  3%  5%  10%  16%  26%  67%  128%
Extra  resources  needed  for PAYG  -57  -32  0  0  0  0  0
(as % of formal  GDP)  -1%  -0.3%  0.0%  0%  0%  0%  0%
Average  replacement  ratio  29%  29%  30%  31%  31%  31%  31%  31%  31%
System  dependency  ratio  111%  118%  114%  107%  99%  71%  68%  71%  69%
Share  of  formal  sector  employment  59%  59%  62%  65%  69%  71%  71%  72%  72%
Note:  It is  assumed  that  in 1997  all  workers  younger  than  30  will  contribute  to funded  tier,  in 1998,  workers  younger
than  31,  etc.  For  these  workers  32%  tax  goes  into  their  personal  account,  1  % is used  for  social  pensions.
Real  interest  rate  on  funded  tier  balance  is 3%  annually.
Scenario 11. Starting the funded tier with the generation younger than 30 in 1997,
lowering social security tax to 23%  for all workers in 1997,  increasing retirement
ages to 65, and maintaining constant replacement  ratio under PAYG
1995  1996  1997  1998  2000  2005  2010  2020  2030
As % of formal  GDP
Payroll  contributions  (all)  8.43  9.14  6.61  7.04  7.46  8.40  8.70  9.21  9.42
Total PAYG  expenditure  8.49  9.64  9.99  10.23  10.33  8.30  8.29  9.01  8.99
Balance  -0.06  -0.50  -3.37  -3.19  -2.87  0.10  0.41  0.20  0.44
Funded  Tier (trillions  of Kbv.,  curr. price)
Total assets  (stock)  137  358  1132  6148  19569  121306  530399
Gov't borrowing  from Funded  tier  137  197  365  1026  2153  9248  28578
(as % of formal  GDP)  1.4%  1.6%  2.1%  3.4%  4.4%  7.1%  8.4%
Stock  of goVt  debt  137  358  1132  6118  18743  115560  508777
(as % of formal  GDP)  1%  3%  7%  20%  38%  88%  149%
Extra  resources  needed  for PAYG  -341  -389  -490  0  0  0  0
(as % of formal  GDP)  -3.4%  -3.2%  -2.9%  0.0%  0.0%  0.0%  0.0%
Average  replacement  ratio  29%  29%  30%  31%  31%  31%  31%  31%  31%
System  dependency  ratio  111%  118%  114%  107%  99%  71%  68%  71%  69%
Share  of formal  sector  employment  59%  59%  62%  65%  69%  71%  71%  72%  72%
Note:  For  workers  enrolled  under  the  new  plan,  22%  tax goes  into  their  personal  account,  1  % is used  for  social  pensions.
Real  interest  rate  on  funded  tier  balance  is 3%  annually.31
Scenario 12. Starting the funded tier with the generation  younger than 30 In 1997,
lowering social security tax for all workes  by 1% a year from 1997  to 2006 (to 23% In 2006),
increasing retirement ages to 65, and maintaining constant replacement ratio under PAYG
1995  1996  1997  1998  2000  2005  2010  2020  2030
As % of  formal GDP
Payroll  contributions  (all)  8.43  9.14  9.14  9.43  9.35  8.76  8.70  9.21  9.42
Total  PAYG  expenditure  8.49  9.64  9.99  10.23  10.33  8.30  8.30  9.01  8.99
Balance  -0.06  -0.50  -0.85  -0.80  -0.97  0.46  0.41  0.20  0.43
Funded  Tier (trillions  of Kbv.,  curr. price)
Total  assets  (stock)  192  492  1496  7268  21264  125200  538987
Gov't  borrowing  from Funded  tier  192  267  462  965  2154  9252  28597
(as  % of formal  GDP)  1.9%  2.2%  2.7%  3.2%  4.4%  7.1%  8.4%
Stock  of gov't  debt  192  492  1496  6614  19498  117325  512827
(as  % of formal  GDP)  2%  4%  9%  22%  39%  90%  150%
Extra  resources  needed  for PAYG  -86  -97  -166  0  0  0  0
(as % of formal  GDP)  -0.8%  -0.8%  -1.0%  0.0%  0.0%  0.0%  0.0%
Average  replacement  ratio  29%  29%  30%  31%  31%  31%  31%  31%  31%
System  dependency  ratio  111%  118%  114%  107%  99%  71%  68%  71%  69%
Share  of formal sector  employment  59%  59%  62%  65%  69%  71%  71%  72%  72%
Note:  In  1997,  for  workers  youngerthan  30, 32%  tax  goes  into  their  personal  account,  1%  is  used  for  social  pensions.
in 1  998,  for  workers  younger  than  31,  31  %  tax  goes  to funded  tier, 1  % is  used  for  social  pensions,  etc.,  and  after  2006,
22%  tax  will  go  to  funded  tier,1  % is  used  for  social  pensions.  Real  interest  rate  on  funded  tier  balance  is 3%  annually.
Scenario 13. Starting the funded tier with the generation younger than 30 in 1997,
lowering social security tax for all workers by 1% a year from 1997  to 2006  (to 23% in 2006),
increasing retirement ages  to 65,  and lowering replacement  ratio under PAYG
1995  1996  1997  1998  2000  2005  2010  2020  2030
As % of formal  GDP
Payroll  contributions  (all)  8.43  9.14  9.14  9.44  9.36  8.76  8.71  9.21  9.42
Total PAYG  expenditure  8.49  9.64  9.89  9.85  9.85  7.75  7.62  7.90  7.59
Balance  -0.06  -0.50  -0.75  -0.41  -0.49  1.02  1.09  1.30  1.84
Funded  Tier  (trillions  of Kbv.,  curr. price)
Total  assets  (stock)  192  492  1495  7264  21256  125176  538928
Gov't  borrowing  from Funded  tier  192  267  462  796  1818  7800  23795
(as % of formal  GDP)  1.9%  2.2%  2.7%  2.6%  3.7%  6.0%  7.0%
Stock  of  govt debt  192  492  1495  5854  16840  99950  433474
(as % of formal  GDP)  2%  4%  9%  19%  34%  76%  127%
Extra  resources  needed  for PAYG  -76  -50  -83  0  0  0  0
(as  % of formnal  GDP)  -0.8%  -0.4%  -0.5%  0%  0%  0%  0%
Average  replacement  ratio  29%  29%  29%  29%  30%  29%  29%  27%  26%
System  dependency  ratio  111%  118%  114%  107%  99%  71%  68%  71%  69%
Share  of formal  sector  employment  59%  59%  62%  65%  68%  71%  71%  72%  72%
Note:  For  workers  enrolled  under  the  new  plan,  22%  tax  goes  Into  their  personal  account,1  % is  used  for  social  pensions.
Real  interest  rate  on  funded  ter balance  is 3%  annually.32
Scenario  14. Starting the funded tier wRh  the generation  younger  than 30 In 1997,
lowering social security tax for all workers by 1% a year from 1997  to 2006  (to 23%  In 2006)
with contribution to the funded tier remaining  at 22%  for the whole period,  increasing
retirement  ages  to 65,  and maintaining constant replacement  ratio under PAYG
1995  1996  1997  1998  2000  2005  2010  2020  2030
As % of formal  GDP
Payroll  contributions  (all)  8.43  9.14  9.14  9.43  9.35  8.76  8.70  9.21  9.42
Total  PAYG  expenditure  8.49  9.64  9.99  10.23  10.33  8.30  8.30  9.01  8.99
Balance  -0.06  -0.50  -0.85  -0.80  -0.97  0.46  0.41  0.20  0.43
Funded  Tier  (trillions  of Kbv.,  curr.  price)
Total  assets  (stock)  134  349  1104  5996  19083  118294  517233
Gov't  borrowing  from Funded  tier  134  192  356  892  2095  9016  27851
(as % of formal  GDP)  1.3%  1.6%  2.1%  2.9%  4.2%  6.9%  8.1%
Stock  of gov't  debt  134  349  1104  5336  17306  110396  491019
(as  % of formal  GDP)  1%  3%  6%  18%  35%  84%  144%
Extra  resources  needed  for PAYG  -86  -97  -166  0  0  0  0
(as  % of formal  GDP)  -0.8%  -0.8%  -1.0%  0.0%  0.0%  0.0%  0.0%
Average  replacement  ratio  29%  29%  30%  31%  31%  31%  31%  31%  31%
Systemdependencyratio  111%  118%  114%  107%  99%  71%  68%  71%  69%
Share  of formal  sector  employment  59%  59%  62%  65%  69%  71%  71%  72%  72%
Note:  In  1997,  for  workers  younger  than  30,  22%  tax  goes  to personal  account,  11  %  to  PAYG,
in 1998,  for  workers  younger  than  31,  22%  tax  to  funded  tier,  10%  to  PAYG,  etc.,  and  after  2006,
22%  tax  will  go  to  funded  tier,1  %  is used  for  social  pensions.  Real  interest  rate  on  funded  tier  balance  is  3%  annually.
This  is  an  optimistic  "what-it'  scenario  in  the  sense  that  share  of  formal  sector  is same  as  Scenario  11.
Scenario  15. Starting the funded tier with the generation  younger than 30 in 1997,
lowering social security tax for all workers by 1%  a year  from 1997  to 2006  (to 23%  In 2006)
with contribution to the funded  tier remaining  at 17%  for the whole period, increasing
retirement  ages  to 65,  and maintaining constant replacement  ratio under PAYG
1995  1996  1997  1998  2000  2005  2010  2020  2030
As % of  formal  GDP
Payroll  contributions  (all)  8.43  9.14  9.14  9.43  9.35  8.76  8.70  9.21  9.42
Total  PAYG  expenditure  8.49  9.64  9.99  10.23  10.33  8.30  8.30  9.01  8.99
Balance  -0.06  -0.50  -0.85  -0.80  -0.97  0.46  0.41  0.20  0.43
Funded  Tier  (trillions  of Kbv.,  curr. price)
Total  assets  (stock)  101  263  831  4513  14742  93294  410362
Gov't  borrowing  from  Funded  tier  101  145  268  637  1632  7145  21933
(as % of  formal  GDP)  1.0%  1.2%  1.6%  2.1%  3.3%  5.5%  6.4%
Stock  of gov't  debt  101  263  831  3853  12965  85396  384149
(as  % offormal  GDP)  1%  2%  5%  13%  26%  65%  112%
Extra  resources  needed  for  PAYG  -86  -97  -166  0  0  0  0
(as % of formal  GDP)  -0.8%  -0.8%  -1.0%  0.0%  0.0%  0.0%  0.0%
Average  replacement  ratio  29%  29%  30%  31%  31%  31%  31%  31%  31%
System  dependency  ratio  111%  118%  114%  107%  99%  71%  68%  71%  69%
Share  of  formal  sector  employment  59%  59%  62%  65%  69%  71%  71%  72%  72%
Note:  In  1997,  for  workers  younger  than  30,  17%  tax  goes  to  personal  account,  16% to PAYG,
in 1998,  for  workers  younger  than  31,  17%  tax  to  funded  tier,  15%  to PAYG,  etc.,  and  after  2006,
17%  tax  will  go  to  funded  tier,  6%  is  used  for  social  pensions.  Real  interest  rate  on  funded  tier  balance  is 3%  annually.
This  is  an  optimistic  'what-if'  scenario  in the  sense  that  share  of  formal  sector  is  same  as  Scenario  11.33
Scenario 16. Staring the funded  tier  with the generation  younger  than  30 In 1997,
lowering  social  security  tax for all  worker  by  1% a year from 1997  to 2004 (to 25% in 2004)
with contribution to the funded tier remaining at 10% for the  whole period, Increasing
retirement ages to 65, and maintaining constant replacement  ratio under PAYG
1995  1996  1997  1998  2000  2005  2010  2020  2030
As % of formal  GDP
Payroll  contributions  (all)  8.43  9.14  9.14  9.43  9.35  9.12  9.44  9.99  10.22
Total PAYG  expenditure  8.49  9.64  9.99  10.23  10.33  8.30  8.30  9.01  8.99
Balance  -0.06  -0.50  -0.85  -0.80  -0.97  0.81  1.15  0.98  1.23
Funded  Tier  (trillions  of Kbv.,  curr.  price)
Total assets  (stock)  61  159  502  2725  8674  53770  235106
Gov't borrowing  from Funded  tier  61  87  162  222  477  2935  9121
(as % of formal  GDP)  0.6%  0.7%  0.9%  0.7%  1.0%  2.2%  2.7%
Stock  of govt debt  61  159  502  1957  4980  32068  153224
(as % offormal GDP)  1%  1%  3%  6%  10%  24%  45%
Extra  resources  needed  for PAYG  -86  -97  -166  0  0  0  0
(as % of  formal GDP)  -0.8%  -0.8%  -1.0%  0.0%  0.0%  0.0%  0.0%
Average  replacement  ratio  29%  29%  30%  31%  31%  31%  31%  31%  31%
System  dependency  ratio  111%  118%  114%  107%  99%  71%  68%  71%  69%
Share  of formal  sector  employment  59%  59%  62%  65%  69%  71%  71%  72%  72%
These scenarios clearly differ in terms of distributional impact. One can distinguish three
relevant population groups: those already retired; those still in the labor force who will be
covered under the new plan; and those also in the labor force but younger who will be covered
partially or fully under the new plan.  The first scenario (10) gives all the benefits of the reform
to the generations enrolling under the new plan.  They will benefit from higher pensions and
higher growth; some of them as well as the next generations will have to pay back the
accumulated debt.  The other population groups can only benefit from the slightly higher growth
that the reform would bring about.  The second and third scenarios (1  1 & 12) shift additional
benefits of the reforms to those still in the labor force who will not participate in the new plan.
As a result, the burden passed on future generations increases.  The fourth scenario (13) lowers
the burden passed on future generations by imposing higher costs to those currently retired.
It would be preferable for equity reasons that each of these population groups gain from
the reform. This would also increase social support. In addition it would be highly inequitable
to make the poorest population groups who have borne all the costs of the transition to a market
economy bear additional costs linked to the implementation of a pension reform. For all these
reasons scenarios 1  1 and 12 appear as the best options. They at least maintain a constant
replacement ratio to those already retired and provide some benefits to those still in the labor
force who will nevertheless retire under the old scheme. The election between them amounts to34
choosing between a gradual or sudden decrease in the contribution rate. While a sudden change
is likely to have more impact in terns  of incentives and acceptability, it can only be implemented
if additional fiscal resources can be found.
Simulations so far have considered the lowering of the contribution rate without previous
discussion of the rationale for choosing a particular rate.  The choice of the contribution rate
under a funded system clearly depends on the "desired" pension level and on investment returns.
We have assumed that investment returns would remain at 3 percent in real terms over the whole
period. Another key assumption is that the acceptability of the reforms will be greater if those
enrolled under the new plan can anticipate larger benefits under the new scheme than with the
previous one.  Although the new system would be contribution-based and thus would not
guarantee a given benefit (or replacement ratio) the contribution rate could be set in function of
an "expected" benefit.  A 22 percent contribution rate could give a replacement ratio of about 50
percent while a 17 percent rate could lead to a 40 percent replacement ratio. Lower contributions
would not bring a clear gain in terms of pension level.  Higher contribution rates are not
considered to leave room for private voluntary pensions that could complement the public
pension.  Any value within that range could equally be considered.
The remaining scenarios (Scenarios 14 & 15) consider these two cases.  In addition they
envisage that, although the new plan would involve a lower contribution rate (either 23 or 17
percent), those enrolling under the new plan would continue during the transition phase to pay
the same tax as other members of the labor force who remain ascribed to the old plan.  The
difference - a true tax - would help covering the cost of current pensions and reduce the amount
of accumulated debt.  In other words, as the overall payroll tax is gradually lowered from 33 to
23 percent, those enrolling under the new system only accumulate 22 percent (or 17 percent in
the second scenario) in their accounts, the difference being used to cover the transition deficit.
When setting the contribution rate to the funded tier at 17 percent, the tax is of course higher and
is imposed over a longer period of time.  As a result, the stock of accumulated government debt
is substantially lower: it would reach 112 percent of GDP by 2030, vs. 144 percent in the other
case.
In all scenarios the transition deficit is high and the stock of government debt
accumulated by 2030 ranges between 112 and 150 percent of GDP.  Servicing that debt,
assuming a 3 percent real interest rate implies annual fiscal resources amounting to 3-4.5 percent
of GDP, a very substantial burden on future generations. This leads to the conclusion that the
preferable option among those analyzed is that corresponding to scenario 15. It leads to the
smallest stock of debt and implies choosing the lowest contribution rate and maintaining some
degree of taxation (although at a decreasing rate) on the labor force. At the same time, this
scenario allows current pensioners to benefit from the economic recovery through the indexation
of pensions on real wage growth. It is worth observing that maintaining beyond the period of
analysis the 5 percent tax (corresponding to the difference between the 22 percent total payroll35
tax and the 17 percent contribution rate to the funded tier) would generate fiscal revenues equal
to about 2-2.5 percent of GDP, a little over half of what would be needed to service the debt.
Of course, if one were to choose a more liberal approach leaving more room to voluntary
private pension schemes, one could envisage an even lower contribution rate which would reduce
further the stock of government debt and the burden on future generations.  This is done in
scenario 16. The debt burden is then lowered to 45 percent of GDP. However, the flexibility for
doing depends on the political will to reduce substantially the role of the state in setting
mandatory contributions. A rate below 14 percent would likely lead to a lower replacement rate
than the one existing under the current scheme.
V.  Summary and Conclusions
The first part of the paper shows that, over recent years, not only the economic
contraction and the accompanying decline in employment and real wages, but also significant
changes in labor market behavior have contributed to a decline of the tax base of the social
security system in Ukraine threatening its sustainability.  Currently 40 percent of the labor force
works exclusively in the informal sector and thus avoids any form of taxation.  A significant
fraction of the remaining 60 percent combine formal and informal activities and hence,
underreport their actual incomes.  These changes affect the short- and medium-term balance of
the fund as those working in the informal sector not only do not contribute to the payment of
benefits to current pensioners but they also keep claims on future benefits either because of  their
previous status of employee in the public sector (government or state-owned enterprise) or
simply because they remain eligible for social pensions.
The sustainability of the pension fund is thus not only function of the level of economic
activity, of demographic factors, and of the set of rules that  govern the pension system.  It also
depends to a large extent on factors which induce the development of informal sector activities
and tax evasion. Among these factors are the changes recently introduced in the pension system
which aim at ensuring its sustainability while preserving a minimum standard of living to low-
income pensioners. The sharp reduction in the benefit level combined with a high rate of
taxation, as well as the loosening of the links between contributions and benefits have
transformed the social security contribution into almost a pure tax on labor.  In addition, the
growing incapacity of the government to provide an adequate level of protection to the old has
reduced the credibility of government-managed social programs,  inducing the development of
private pension schemes.
With this socio-economic background as starting point, and with the help of a model that
takes into account links between the social security system, the labor market, and the overall
macroeconomic framework, simulations were run to assess the sustainability of the current36
pension system as well as the relevance and viability of possible reforms.  All of them assume
the pursuit of economic reforms and the recovery of a sustained growth path.
The first conclusion of the analysis is that the view that economic contraction is the main
cause of the difficulties faced by the pension fund is not correct. Sustained growth and
macroeconomic stability would not be enough to restore the benefit levels and features
prevailing in the past. Attempting to increase the range of payments and the overall replacement
ratio would - even with growth - lead to a substantial increase in the fund's deficit, threatening
macroeconomic stability. Almost all the labor force would need to be working in the formal
sector - an unlikely event with the present set of labor market incentives - to reverse the answer.
The paper also examines the viability of the current "statu quo".  Benefits have been
reduced and the range of payments is compressed, transforming the pension system into a highly
redistributive system, practically a social assistance program which provides modest benefits to a
large proportion of the population.  The analysis leads to the conclusion that this could not
become a permanent feature of the system as sustainability would require no further increase in
the relative size of the informal sector.  However, this is inconsistent with the whole set of
incentives favorable to the development of informal activities that would remain in place.
The conclusion of the first part of the paper is clear: reforms are necessary. Even with a
fairly optimistic growth scenario, there is little prospect that the difficulties faced by the pension
system will gradually disappear. On the one hand, restoring the past features of the system would
be too costly.  On the other hand, keeping the system as it is would maintain mechanisms that
tend to make it unsustainable.
The second part of the paper first considers reforms of limited scope aimed at saving
resources or at improving revenue collections. These are found to be insufficient or ineffective
as they fail to address the issue of the incentive framework. The only effective measure is to
increase the retirement age which has a significant financial impact.  An increase up to the age of
65 would be needed for both men and women.  Raising the retirement age fast rather than
gradually would ease the fiscal adjustment in the early years and may imply less political cost  as
it would be implemented when labor force participation rates of old people are high as it is the
case now in Ukraine. However, the analysis also shows that, however significant and necessary,
raising retirement age would not by itself ensure the sustainability of the pension fund.  This
measure needs to be accompanied by deeper structural reforms.
The paper then examines more radical reforms consisting of a shift from the current
PAYG to a fully-funded system which could be privately managed (although subject to public
regulations).  Such reforms will be an effective way to remove distortions in the incentive
framework and to restore credibility in the system. The analysis focuses on selected alternatives
and key policy variables. All scenarios maintain three basic assumptions.  The first one is that the37
introduction of a funded  system would induce an increase in the formal sector by removing
distortions in the incentive framework. The increase, however, is assumed to be gradual and
moderate. The second assumption  is that the assets of the funded tier will, in the early years,
comprise mostly government debt to allow for the financing of the transition with realistic fiscal
implications.  Third, all scenarios assume that a small redistributive component (payment of
social pensions and a minimum guaranteed pension) would remain the responsibility of the new
pension fund.
With these assumptions the model generates simulations that allow the identification of
the best option that entails: (a)  indexing  pensions using real wage growth for pensioners under
the old scheme (that is to maintain a constant replacement ratio); and (b) maintaining during the
transitional phase some degree of taxation on those enrolling under the new plan while ensuring
an expected pension benefit higher than in the recent past.  In such case, all generations
including those that have suffered most during the early stages of the transition to a market
economy would benefit from the reform and growth recovery.
The reform would also include a lowering of the contribution rate for all workers
(covered under the old and the new plan) and an increase of the retirement age to 65.  A rapid
decrease in the contribution rate is likely to have more impact in terms of acceptability,
credibility and incentives. However, it cannot be implemented without an equally rapid increase
in the retirement age and additional budgetary resources.
The analysis shows the need to lower the payroll tax from 33 to 23 percent for all workers
and to set at 17 percent  the contribution rate to the funded tier. Maintaining a 6 percent tax on
those enrolling under the new system would help financing the transition deficit. And setting the
contribution rate at about 17 percent would provide higher pension levels under the new plan
than under the old plan while minimizing the stock of debt left to future generations.  There is
obviously some flexibility in the choice of these particular rates depending on the weight that one
wishes to give to public and mandatory  pension schemes vs private and voluntary ones.
Lowering further the contribution rate to the fully-funded system would lower the stock of debt
and increase the weight of private voluntary schemes. Imposing a less than 6 percent tax on
those enrolling under the new system would imply a higher burden for future generations.
In summary, the main conclusions of the paper are as follows.  Reforms of the pension
system in Ukraine are undoubtedly necessary and urgent even in case of  economic and sustained
growth. However reforms which focus on short-term budgetary effects and do not consider the
interactions between the social security system and the labor market are likely to fail.  Reforms
must consider introducing a funded tier as an effective way to correct distortions and to restore
credibility. They must also include an increase in the retirement age. Introducing such reforms
will be costly and impose an unavoidable burden to future generations. Those generations,38
however, will also be the beneficiaries of the refonn, enjoying higher pension levels as well as
higher productivity growth.
Appendix  A
Specification  of the Model
Overview
This appendix  briefly describes  the model  used in the simulations  reported  in sections  IV and V
of the paper.  The model  consists  of four modules:  Pension  Fund, labor  market, macroeconomic,  and
demographic  modules.  All data sources  and projections  are based on annual  numbers.  The
macroeconomic  module  was developed  based on the World  Bank's RMSM-X  model. The most
important  distinction  of this model is the inclusion  of the informal  sector  and the full specification  of the
production  function.  (Only  modifications  to the standard  RMSM-X  model are documented  in this
Appendix.  Complete  specification  of the RMSM-X  model can be found in standard  World  Bank
documentations  such  as User's Guide  to the RMSM-X,  The World  Bank, May 1995.)
Production
The economy  produces  one good for both consumption  and investment.  Production  takes place
in two sectors:  formal  and informal  sectors. The informal  sector  avoids  paying  taxes, including  the
social  security  tax. Following  the assumptions  of the endogenous  growth  model (Corsetti  and Schmidt-
Hebbel,  1995),  the level of production  in the formal sector  (YI) is determined  by the available  capital
stock (Kr)  and the effective  labor  (Jlt) allocated  to the formal sector:
(1)  Ylt  = AKt  Jlt  (  -)9
where A is a productivity  index  and a is a parameter  of the Cobb-Douglas  production  function. The
effective  labor in both sectors  is determined  by labor-time  (Lt) valued at the average  labor  productivity
in year t and time-varying  labor  efficiency  (et). The latter  is assumed  to be determined  by the economy-
wide capital intensity:
(2)  Jit = et Lit _  (Kt  / Lt)  Lit.
The informal  sector  only uses labor. Output  is determined  by the amount  of effective  labor  and
the informal  sector labor  productivity:
(3)  Y2t  = A (1- ft ) J2t,
where ft is the efficiency  loss due to the extra costs of operating  in the informal  sector. It is measured  by:
(4)  ft=al  +a2 h2t  + a3 gft,
where gf measures  government's  resources  devoted  to tax administration,  and h 2t is share of one sector's
labor  time in overall labor:39
(5)  hit = Lit  / Lt,
So equation  (4) implies  that the cost of operating  in the informal  sector  increases  with the size of the
sector.
The overall output  can now be written  as a function  of labor  allocation  between  two sectors  and
capital  stock:
(6)  Yt = Y,t + Y2t =A4(hit(lca)  + (1- ft) h2t ) K,
With this specification,  moving  labor  out of the formal  sector  is equivalent  to reducing  capital
stock in the formal  sector.
Wages and Allocation  of Labor  between  Sectors
Labor flows  between  the formal  and informal  sectors  are induced  by changes  in relative  wages.
Workers  in the formal sector  have  to contribute  to the social security  system  and pay taxes. The  net
wage (WI) in the formal sector  is thus:
(7)  Wlt = (1 - sst  (1-dt )) WTt,
where sst  is the social  security  tax rate, WTt is the gross wage in the formal  sector,  and dt measures  the
extent  to which social security  contributions  are perceived  as a tax. At one extreme,  dt = 0 when future
pension  benefits  are totally  unrelated  to the amounts  of social security  contributions  (e.g., when  pension
benefit is flat). At the other  extreme,  dt  1 when  the present  value of pension  benefits  is equal to the
present  value  of contributions  discounted  at the market rate of return  (i.e., a fully-funded  pension
system.) So given  the social security  tax rate and the level of efficiency  loss in the informal  sector,  an
individual's  expected  value of dt is determined  by:
(8)  dit  = (PBTit  -PBSij  )/MRit
where i is the person's age, PBTt is the present  value (PV) of total expected  pension benefits  in year t for
a person  with age i that pays social security  tax, PBSt is the PV of expected social  pensions  (available  to
non-contributors  beyond  the legal retirement  age),  and MRt  is the PV of total social  security
contributions  if the tax is paid until  the expected  retirement  time.
The expected  lifetime  pension  benefit for being in the formal sector  can be calculated  as:
(9)  PBTit =>+n-i  Il>j>t+n-ij  (I- MORjt+ij Xl/(l+r)'-)Yk  PFPk FPkI  ) / fit>j>t  (1- MORjt+ij),
where PFPk  is the probability  of enjoying  type k pension  upon retirement  age, n is the expected
retirement  age,  FPkl  is the pension  payment  in year I for type k pension,  r is the real interest  rate, and
MOR.t  is the average  mortality  rate for age I in year t. The  value for PBS is calculated  in the exactly
same way.40
The  value of MR for a person  with age i in year t is:
(1  0)  MRjt  =  n-i+tI>t 1 (fl>j>t  (1- MORj-t+ij  ) (1/(l+r)  4) ss  WTI ),
Equations  (7) to (10) show that social security  reforms  create incentives  for the expansion  of the
formal sector  to the extent that they induce  an increase  in d, and thus a reduction in the wedge between
gross and net wages in the formal sector.
The allocation  of labor  between  the two sectors is determined  by a static equilibrium  condition
and a dynamic  adjustment  process. The static equilibrium  condition  is:
(11)  SLi 8 = (WX  + p1)Y  / Ej=1,2  (Wj +  pjY,
where SL is the static share of labor in each sector,  y is an elasticity  parameter,  and 1.  represents  non-
pecuniary  factors  determining  labor  allocation.  The actual  share of labor  before  equilibrium  is attained is
determined  by:
(12)  SL 1t = 0 SLi 8 + (1 - 0) SL 1t l,
where 0 is a parameter  representing  the speed  of labor share adjustments.
Labor  Supply
Total labor  supply  NTt can be defined  as:
(13)  NTt  = Fi>18Xjm,f  S tij G tij N tjj - Zi>18Zj,f  S tjj L  tij
where  N tjj is the total number  of population  with age i and sexj in year t, S tij is the average  labor
participation  rate for population  cohort  Ntij,  and G tij  is the ratio of cohort-specific  to average labor
productivity  in year t. G tij  is influenced  by experience  and age.
Economy-wide  actual  unemployment  is the amount  of excess  labor supply:
(14)  UN t = NT t -Lt =-  NT t -Lit -L2t 
While official  unemployment  is total labor supply  minus official  employment:
( 15)  UNO  t = NT t - Llt - L2t - (I  - t) LOt.
where  LOt is the number  of people  officially  employed  but not working  in the formal sector  in time t.
These  people  do not contribute  to the Pension  Fund;  however,  they remain eligible  for old-age  pensions
when  they reach the retirement  age. In other countries,  the ratio Lit / (Llt + LOJ)  would be called  the
compliance  rate. However,  for Ukraine  a large part of LOt is legal, and there is no way of knowing  the
true compliance  rate. To avoid  confusion,  we do not use the compliance  rate terminology.  Note that a41
person can have  an offical  employment  status and work in the informal sector  at the same  time. So t is
the percentage  of people in such a situation.
Number  of Pensioners
Under the current  pension law,  there are four types of pensions:  old-age,  disability,  survivor  and
social  pensions  (disregarding  service  pensions  which are negligible). In the model, each pensioner  is
tracked by age and sex. The  number  of new old-age  pensioners  PENOt in period t is:
(16)  PENOt =  ij,,f  RET  tij ELGtij  N ti,
where  ELG  tij, the percentage  of people  who are eligible  for old-age  pensions  in cohort  Ntij, is
determined  by age and years of contributions.  RET  tij  is the percentage  of eligible  people  who actually
receives  an old-age  pension.
The number  of new disability  pensioners  is determined  by:
(17)  PENDt = ZiYj,f  DIStjj  (Lltij + LOtij ),
where  DIStij  is the probability  of a worker being  disabled  in labor cohort  L tij. Note that everyone  on the
official  employment  list is eligible  for this type of pension.
The number  of new survivor's pensioners  is determined  by:
(18)  PENSt  = ZijYj=-mf  MORtjj  SURtjj (L Itij  + LO  tij  ),
where  MORtij  is the mortality  rate for population  cohort  Ntij,  and SUR&j  is the proportion  of survivors  per
worker.
The  total number  of old-age  and disability  pensioners  is:
(19)  PENOTt  = PENOt  + Eij,,f  (1 - MORtj)  PENOT  t-,,
and
(20)  PENDTt = PENDt +  ZjSj£,f  (I - MORtij)  PENDT t- ,ij.
The  total number  of survivor's  pensioners  is determined  by:
(21)  PENSTt = PENSt + ZiFj=MXf  f  (1 - MORtj) PENST t- 1,,j - PENST t-,,  Isj.
The last item in equation  (21) reflects  the fact that children  reaching  the age of 18  are no longer  eligible
for this type of pensions.
The total number  of social  pensioners  is calculated  as a residual:42
(22)  PENSOt= EiEj-m,f  COVtij  (Ntij  - Ltij  - (1 - i.) LOtj - PENOTtij - PENDT  tj- PENSTtij )
where COV  tij  is the social  pension coverage  rate of the non-working  population  who do not receive  any
other  pension,  and i must be equal or exceed  the legal  retirement  age.
Finally,  the total number  of pensioners  is:
(23)  PENt  =  Zij=mf ( PENOT  tij  + PENDT  tij  + PENST  tij  + PENSO  ti).
Pension levels
Currently,  the old-age  and disability  pensions  are calculated  using a complex  five-step  formula:
(1) the average  salary  is calculated  for the last two years preceding  retirement;  (2) a replacement  salary  is
calculated  based on the level of average  salary;  (3) a statuary  replacement  rate is calculated  based on
years of service;  (4) the minimum  floor and maximum  ceiling  of pensions  is imposed;  and (5) a means-
tested pension floor is applied  for low-income  pensioners  (see Table 1.5, 1.6, and 1.7  in Kane (1996) for
details).
The  pension  rate for survivor  pensioners  depends  on replaceable  salary  of the deceased  worker
and the type of survivor  (see Table 1.8  in Kane (1996) for details). The full rate of pension  is 30 percent
of replaceable  salary. The  Pension is also subject  to a minimum  pension. Social  pension  rate is set as
minimum  pension.
For the projection  period,  the minimum  pension  is assumed  to be a certain  percentage  of the
official  minimum  wage. The latter is fully  adjusted  for inflation  and but only partially  indexed  to the
average  real wage:
(24)  mwt  =inft+  wIt,  1>+>O,
where  mw is the growth  rate of minimum  wage, inf is inflation  rate, and w, is the growth  rate of wages in
the formal sector.
Pension Fund Balance
The current  Pension  Fund  is based on the defined-benefit  "Pay-As-You-Go"  scheme.  For the
fund to balance,  the social security  tax rate must equal the system  dependency  ratio times replacement
ratio:
(25)  sst = (PENt  / LI ) * (Pt / WTJ,
where Pt is the average  pension level. So for a given s
ocial security  tax rate, the pension  fund balance  depends  on the relative size  of pensioners  versus
contributors  and the relative  magnitude  of average  pension  versus  wage.43
The Pension  Fund obtains  inflows  from social security  tax contributions,  the government
budgetary  transfer (BT), interest income/loss  from existing  fund balance,  and other sources  of income
(OS) such as voluntary  contributions  from companies  and individuals:
(26)  SIt = sst Lit WTt + BTt + PFBt-l rgt + OSt,
Outlays  can be defined  as:
(27)  SEt = 7iXj,,f  rk  b tk W t PEN tijk + AD t
where b is the fraction  of the average  wage that equals  the pension  payment  for type k pension (including
the social  pension). AD  t is the administrative  cost of running  the Pension  Fund.  It is assumed  to increase
with the size of the Fund:
(28)  AD t = b,  + b2 SEt .
The Fund balance  at the end of period  t is:
(29)  PFB t = PFBtl  + SI t - SE t.44
Appendix B
Average  Annual  Total  Population  Growth  Rate
1990-2000  2000-2010  2010-2020  2020-2030
World  1.59  1.34  1.17  1.00
Low  & Middle-income  econ.  1.84  1.55  1.34  1.15
Brazil  1.72  1.27  1.12  0.86
China  1.33  0.94  0.81  0.68
High-income  econ.  0.56  0.39  0.25  0.15
Europe  & FSU  continental  0.44  0.38  0.29  0.25
Ukraine  0.36  0.29  0.24  0.25
Russian  Federation  0.46  0.44  0.38  0.31
Belarus  0.51  0.43  0.36  0.33
Czechoslovakia  0.25  0.37  0.31  0.28
Germany  0.20  0.02  -0.11  -0.16
Hungary  -0.38  -0.14  -0.10  -0.05
Poland  0.41  0.46  0.41  0.35
Data  source:  World Bank.
Percent  of Population  Aged  65 and  Up
1990  2000  2010  2020  2030
World  6  7  7  9  11
Low  & Middle-income  econ.  5  5  6  7  10
Brazil  4  5  6  9  12
China  6  7  8  11  15
High-income  econ.  13  15  16  20  24
Europe  & FSU  continental  12  14  15  18  21
Ukraine  13  16  16  18  20
Russian  Federation  11  14  14  18  20
Belarus  12  15  15  18  20
Czechoslovakia  12  13  13  17  19
Germany  15  17  21  23  28
Hungary  14  15  17  20  21
Poland  10  12  12  16  19
Data  source:  World  Bank.45
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